Monday, 26 January 2009

The Crisis: The Guardian Names Names

Never backward in going forward to apportion blame for capitalism's ills, the Guardian has taken upon itself to name those responsible. There is more than a mere redolence of McCarthyism but I do have to take issue with the naming of Hank Greenberg who retired in 2005. He was not dictating corporate policy at the time.

Steve Eismann and Meredith Whitney are heroes. If you are one of the few that hasn't yet done so, please read Michael Lewis's article posted earlier this month in this blog.

http://theconstantbroker.blogspot.com/2008/12/markets-michael-lewiss-brilliant.html

Twenty-five people at the heart of the meltdown ...

The worst economic turmoil since the Great Depression is not a natural phenomenon but a man-made disaster in which we all played a part. In the second part of a week-long series looking behind the slump, Guardian City editor Julia Finch picks out the individuals who have led us into the current crisis

Greenspan Testifies At Senate Hearing On Oil Dependence

Former Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan, who backed sub-prime lending. Photograph: Mark Wilson/Getty Images

Alan Greenspan, chairman of US Federal Reserve 1987- 2006
Only a couple of years ago the long-serving chairman of the Fed, a committed free marketeer who had steered the US economy through crises ranging from the 1987 stockmarket collapse through to the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, was lauded with star status, named the "oracle" and "the maestro". Now he is viewed as one of those most culpable for the crisis. He is blamed for allowing the housing bubble to develop as a result of his low interest rates and lack of regulation in mortgage lending. He backed sub-prime lending and urged homebuyers to swap fixed-rate mortgages for variable rate deals, which left borrowers unable to pay when interest rates rose.

For many years, Greenspan also defended the booming derivatives business, which barely existed when he took over the Fed, but which mushroomed from $100tn in 2002 to more than $500tn five years later.

Billionaires George Soros and Warren Buffett might have been extremely worried about these complex products - Soros avoided them because he didn't "really understand how they work" and Buffett famously described them as "financial weapons of mass destruction" - but Greenspan did all he could to protect the market from what he believed was unnecessary regulation. In 2003 he told the Senate banking committee: "Derivatives have been an extraordinarily useful vehicle to transfer risk from those who shouldn't be taking it to those who are willing to and are capable of doing so".

In recent months, however, he has admitted at least some of his long-held beliefs have turned out to be incorrect - not least that free markets would handle the risks involved, that too much regulation would damage Wall Street and that, ultimately, banks would always put the protection of their shareholders first.

He has described the current financial crisis as "the type ... that comes along only once in a century" and last autumn said the fact that the banks had played fast and loose with shareholders' equity had left him "in a state of shocked disbelief".

Politicians

Bill Clinton, former US president
Clinton shares at least some of the blame for the current financial chaos. He beefed up the 1977 Community Reinvestment Act to force mortgage lenders to relax their rules to allow more socially disadvantaged borrowers to qualify for home loans.

In 1999 Clinton repealed the Glass-Steagall Act, which ensured a complete separation between commercial banks, which accept deposits, and investment banks, which invest and take risks. The move prompted the era of the superbank and primed the sub-prime pump. The year before the repeal sub-prime loans were just 5% of all mortgage lending. By the time the credit crunch blew up it was approaching 30%.

Gordon Brown, prime minister
The British prime minister seems to have been completely dazzled by the movers and shakers in the Square Mile, putting the City's interests ahead of other parts of the economy, such as manufacturers. He backed "light touch" regulation and a low-tax regime for the thousands of non-domiciled foreign bankers working in London and for the private equity business.

George W Bush, former US president
President Clinton might have started the sub-prime ball rolling, but the Bush administration certainly did little to put the brakes on the vast amount of mortgage cash being lent to "Ninja" (No income, no job applicants) borrowers who could not afford them. Neither did he rein back Wall Street with regulation (although the government did pass the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the wake of the Enron scandal).

Senator Phil Gramm
Former US senator from Texas, free market advocate with a PhD in economics who fought long and hard for financial deregulation. His work, encouraged by Bill Clinton's administration, allowed the explosive growth of derivatives, including credit swaps. In 2001 he told a Senate debate: "Some people look at sub-prime lending and see evil," he said. "I look at sub-prime lending and I see the American dream in action."

According to the New York Times, federal records show that from 1989 to 2002 he was the top recipient of campaign contributions from commercial banks and in the top five for donations from Wall Street. At an April 2000 Senate hearing after a visit to New York, he said: "When I am on Wall Street and I realise that that's the very nerve centre of American capitalism and I realise what capitalism has done for the working people of America, to me that's a holy place."

He eventually left Capitol Hill to work for UBS as an investment banker.

Wall Street/Bankers

Abi Cohen, Goldman Sachs chief US strategist
The "perpetual bull". Once rated one of the most powerful women in the US. But so wrong, so often. She failed to see previous share price crashes and was famous for her upwards forecasts. Replaced last March.

"Hank" Greenberg, AIG insurance group
Now aged 83, Hank - AKA Maurice - was the boss of AIG. He built the business into the world's biggest insurer. AIG had a vast business in credit default swaps and therefore a huge exposure to a residential mortgage crisis. When AIG's own credit-rating was cut, it faced a liquidity crisis and needed an $85bn (£47bn then) bail out from the US government to avoid collapse and avert the crisis its collapse would have caused. It later needed many more billions from the US treasury and the Fed, but that did not stop senior AIG executives taking themselves off for a few lavish trips, including a $444,000 golf and spa retreat in California and an $86,000 hunting expedition to England. "Have you heard of anything more outrageous?" said Elijah Cummings, a Democratic congressman from Maryland. "They were getting their manicures, their facials, pedicures, massages while the American people were footing the bill."

Andy Hornby, former HBOS boss
So highly respected, so admired and so clever - top of his 800-strong class at Harvard - but it was his strategy, adopted from the Bank of Scotland when it merged with Halifax, that got HBOS in the trouble it is now. Who would have thought that the mighty Halifax could be brought to its knees and teeter on the verge of nationalisation?

Sir Fred Goodwin, former RBS boss
Once one of Gordon Brown's favourite businessmen, now the prime minister says he is "angry" with the man dubbed "Fred the Shred" for his strategy at Royal Bank of Scotland, which has left the bank staring at a £28bn loss and 70% owned by the government. The losses will reflect vast lending to businesses that cannot repay and write-downs on acquisitions masterminded by Goodwin stretching back years.

Steve Crawshaw, former B&B boss
Once upon a time Bradford & Bingley was a rather boring building society, which used two men in bowler hats to signify their sensible and trustworthy approach. In 2004 the affable Crawshaw took over. He closed down B&B businesses, cut staff numbers by half and turned the B&B into a specialist in buy-to-let loans and self-certified mortgages - also called "liar loans" because applicants did not have to prove a regular income. The business broke down when the wholesale money market collapsed and B&B's borrowers fell quickly into debt. Crawshaw denied a rights issue was on its way weeks before he asked shareholders for £300m. Eventually, B&B had to be nationalised. Crawshaw, however, had left the bridge a few weeks earlier as a result of heart problems. He has a £1.8m pension pot.

Adam Applegarth, former Northern Rock boss
Applegarth had such big ambitions. But the business model just collapsed when the credit crunch hit. Luckily for Applegarth, he walked away with a wheelbarrow of cash to ease the pain of his failure, and spent the summer playing cricket.

Ralph Cioffi and Matthew Tannin
Cioffi, pictured, and Tanninn were Bear Stearns bankers recently indicted for fraud over the collapse of two hedge funds last year, which was one of the triggers of the credit crunch. They are accused of lying to investors about the amount of money they were putting into sub-prime, and of quietly withdrawing their own funds when times got tough.

Lewis Ranieri
The "godfather" of mortgage finance, who pioneered mortgage-backed bonds in the 1980s and immortalised in Liar's Poker. Famous for saying that "mortgages are math", Ranieri created collateralised pools of mortgages. In 2004 Business Week ranked him alongside names such as Bill Gates and Steve Jobs as one of the greatest innovators of the past 75 years.

Ranieri did warn in 2006 of the risks from the breakneck growth of mortgage securitisation. Nevertheless, his Texas-based Franklin Bank Corp went bust in November due to the credit crunch.

Joseph Cassano, AIG Financial Products
Cassano ran the AIG team that sold credit default swaps in London, and in effect bankrupted the world's biggest insurance company, forcing the US government to stump up billions in aid. Cassano, who lives in a townhouse near Harrods in Knightsbridge, earned 30 cents for every dollar of profit his financial products generated - or about £280m. He was fired after the division lost $11bn, but stayed on as a $1m-a-month consultant. "It seems he single-handedly brought AIG to its knees," said John Sarbanes, a Democratic congressman.

Chuck Prince, former Citi boss
A lawyer by training, Prince had built Citi into the biggest bank in the world, with a sprawling structure that covered investment banking, high-street banking and wealthy management for the richest clients. When profits went into reverse in 2007, he insisted it was just a hiccup, but he was forced out after multibillion-dollar losses on sub-prime business started to surface. He received about $140m to ease his pain .

Angelo Mozilo, Countrywide Financial
Known as "the orange one" for his luminous tan, Mozilo was the chairman and chief executive of the biggest American sub-prime mortgage lender, which was saved from bankruptcy by Bank of America. BoA recently paid billions to settle investigations by various attorney generals for Countrywide's mis-selling of risky loans to thousands who could not afford them. The company ran a "VIP programme" that provided loans on favourable terms to influential figures including Christopher Dodd, chairman of the Senate banking committee, the heads of the federal-backed mortgage lenders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and former assistant secretary of state Richard Holbrooke.

Stan O'Neal, former boss of Merrill Lynch
O'Neill became one of the highest-profile casualties of the credit crunch when he lost the confidence of the bank's board in late 2007. When he was appointed to the top job four years earlier, O'Neal, the first African-American to run a Wall Street firm, had pledged to shed the bank's conservative image. Shortly before he quit, the bank admitted to nearly $8bn of exposure to bad debts, as bets in the property and credit markets turned sour. Merrill was forced into the arms of Bank of America less than a year later.

Jimmy Cayne, former Bear Stearns boss
The chairman of the Wall Street firm Bear Stearns famously continued to play in a bridge tournament in Detroit even as the firm fell into crisis. Confidence in the bank evaporated after the collapse of two of its hedge funds and massive write-downs from losses related to the home loans industry. It was bought for a knock down price by JP Morgan Chase in March. Cayne sold his stake in the firm after the JP Morgan bid emerged, making $60m. Such was the anger directed towards Cayne that the US media reported that he had been forced to hire a bodyguard. A one-time scrap-iron salesman, Cayne joined Bear Stearns in 1969 and became one of the firm's top brokers, taking over as chief executive in 1993.

Others

Christopher Dodd, chairman, Senate banking committee (Democrat)
Consistently resisted efforts to tighten regulation on the mortgage finance firms Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. He pushed to broaden their role to dodgier mortgages in an effort to help home ownership for the poor. Received $165,000 in donations from Fannie and Freddie from 1989 to 2008, more than anyone else in Congress.

Geir Haarde, Icelandic prime minister
He announced on Friday that he would step down and call an early election in May, after violent anti-government protests fuelled by his handling of the financial crisis. Last October Iceland's three biggest commercial banks collapsed under billions of dollars of debts. The country was forced to borrow $2.1bn from the International Monetary Fund and take loans from several European countries. Announcing his resignation, Haarde said he had throat cancer.

The American public
There's no escaping the fact: politicians might have teed up the financial system and failed to police it properly and Wall Street's greedy bankers might have got carried away with the riches they could generate, but if millions of Americans had just realised they were borrowing more than they could repay then we would not be in this mess. The British public got just as carried away. We are the credit junkies of Europe and many of our problems could easily have been avoided if we had been more sensible and just said no.

Mervyn King, governor of the Bank of England
When Mervyn King settled his feet under the desk in his Threadneedle Street office, the UK economy was motoring along just nicely: GDP was growing at 3% and inflation was just 1.3%. Chairing his first meeting of the Bank's monetary policy committee (MPC), interest rates were cut to a post-war low of 3.5%. His ambition was that monetary policy decision-making should become "boring".

How we would all like it to become boring now. When the crunch first took hold, the Aston Villa-supporting governor insisted it was not about to become an international crisis. In the first weeks of the crunch he refused to pump cash into the financial system and insisted that "moral hazard" meant that some banks should not be bailed out. The Treasury select committee has said King should have been "more pro-active".

King's MPC should have realised there was a housing bubble developing and taken action to damp it down and, more recently, the committee should have seen the recession coming and cut interest rates far faster than it did.

John Tiner, FSA chief executive, 2003-07
No one can fault 51-year-old Tiner's timing: the financial services expert took over as the City's chief regulator in 2003, just as the bear market which followed the dotcom crash came to an end, and stepped down from the Financial Services Authority in July 2007 - just a few weeks before the credit crunch took hold.

He presided over the FSA when the so-called "light touch" regulation was put in place. It was Tiner who agreed that banks could make up their own minds about how much capital they needed to hoard to cover their risks. And it was on his watch that Northern Rock got so carried away with the wholesale money markets and 130% mortgages. When the FSA finally got around to investigating its own part in the Rock's downfall, it was a catalogue of errors and omissions. In short, the FSA had been asleep at the wheel while Northern Rock racked up ever bigger risks.

An accountant by training, with a penchant for Porsches and proud owner of the personalised number plate T1NER, the former FSA boss has since been recruited by the financial entrepreneur Clive Cowdery to run a newly floated business that aims to buy up financial businesses laid low by the credit crunch. Tiner will be chief executive but, unusually, will not be on the board, so his pay and bonuses will not be made public.

Dick Fuld, Lehman Brothers chief executive
The credit crunch had been rumbling on for more than a year but Lehman Brothers' collapse in September was to have a catastrophic impact on confidence. Richard Fuld, chief executive, later told Congress he was bewildered the US government had not saved the bank when it had helped secure Bear Stearns and the insurer AIG. He also blamed short-sellers. Bitter workers at Lehman pointed the finger at Fuld.

A former bond trader known as "the Gorilla", Fuld had been with Lehman for decades and steered it through tough times. But just before the bank went bust he had failed to secure a deal to sell a large stake to the Korea Development Bank and most likely prevent its collapse. Fuld encouraged risk-taking and Lehman was still investing heavily in property at the top of the market. Facing a grilling on Capitol Hill, he was asked whether it was fair that he earned $500m over eight years. He demurred; the figure, he said, was closer to $300m.

... and six more who saw it coming

Andrew Lahde
A hedge fund boss who quit the industry in October thanking "stupid" traders and "idiots" for making him rich. He made millions by betting against sub-prime.

John Paulson, hedge fund boss
He has been described as the "world's biggest winner" from the credit crunch, earning $3.7bn (£1.9bn) in 2007 by "shorting" the US mortgage market - betting that the housing bubble was about to burst. In an apparent response to criticism that he was profiting from misery, Paulson gave $15m to a charity aiding people fighting foreclosure.

Professor Nouriel Roubini
Described by the New York Times as Dr Doom, the economist from New York University was warning that financial crisis was on the way in 2006, when he told economists at the IMF that the US would face a once-in-a-lifetime housing bust, oil shock and a deep recession.

He remains a pessimist. He predicted last week that losses in the US financial system could hit $3.6tn before the credit crunch ends - which, he said, means the entire US banking system is in effect bankrupt. After last year's bail-outs and nationalisations, he famously described George Bush, Henry Paulson and Ben Bernanke as "a troika of Bolsheviks who turned the USA into the United Socialist State Republic of America".

Warren Buffett, billionaire investor
Dubbed the Sage of Omaha, Buffett had long warned about the dangers of dodgy derivatives that no one understood and said often that Wall Street's finest were grossly overpaid. In his annual letter to shareholders in 2003, he compared complex derivative contracts to hell: "Easy to enter and almost impossible to exit." On an optimistic note, Buffett wrote in October that he had begun buying shares on the US stockmarket again, suggesting the worst of the credit crunch might be over. Now is a great time to "buy a slice of America's future at a marked-down price", he said.

George Soros, speculator
The billionaire financier, philanthropist and backer of the Democrats told an audience in Singapore in January 2006 that stockmarkets were at their peak, and that the US and global economies should brace themselves for a recession and a possible "hard landing". He also warned of "a gigantic real estate bubble" inflated by reckless lenders, encouraging homeowners to remortgage and offering interest-only deals. Earlier this year Soros described a 25-year "super bubble" that is bursting, blaming unfathomable financial instruments, deregulation and globalisation. He has since characterised the financial crisis as the worst since the Great Depression.

Stephen Eismann, hedge fund manager
An analyst and fund manager who tracked the sub-prime market from the early 1990s. "You have to understand," he says, "I did sub-prime first. I lived with the worst first. These guys lied to infinity. What I learned from that experience was that Wall Street didn't give a shit what it sold."

Meredith Whitney, Oppenheimer Securities
On 31 October 2007 the analyst forecast that Citigroup had to slash its dividend or face bankruptcy. A day later $370bn had been wiped off financial stocks on Wall Street. Within days the boss of Citigroup was out and the dividend had been slashed.

Kathleen Corbet, former CEO, Standard & Poor's
The credit-rating agencies were widely attacked for failing to warn of the risks posed by mortgage-backed securities. Kathleen Corbet ran the largest of the big three agencies, Standard & Poor's, and quit in August 2007, amid a hail of criticism. The agencies have been accused of acting as cheerleaders, assigning the top AAA rating to collateralised debt obligations, the often incomprehensible mortgage-backed securities that turned toxic. The industry argues it did its best with the information available.

Corbet said her decision to leave the agency had been "long planned" and denied that she had been put under any pressure to quit. She kept a relatively low profile and had been hired to run S&P in 2004 from the investment firm Alliance Capital Management.

Investigations by the Securities and Exchange Commission and the New York attorney general among others have focused on whether the agencies are compromised by earning fees from the banks that issue the debt they rate. The reputation of the industry was savaged by a blistering report by the SEC that contained dozens of internal emails that suggested they had betrayed investors' trust. "Let's hope we are all wealthy and retired by the time this house of cards falters," one unnamed S&P analyst wrote. In another, an S&P employee wrote:

"It could be structured by cows and we would rate it."

Metals: Gold Silver Ratio By Gareth Milliams

The Gold/Silver Ratio is seen by many as an indicator of a recovering market. However, with the crash in silver prices in October, its recovery is probably just an indicator of having been oversold.

The ratio is based upon the gold price divided by that of silver, with 0.75 being the present value. In a strong economy, look for silver to head toward 0.50.

I do expect silver to strengthen in the medium term versus gold to less than 0.70. However, gold is on a journey of its own with a possibility of $1000 per oz. beckoning.

Gold & Silver comparison and ratio in (red)

Saturday, 24 January 2009

Investment: Overcoming Fear By Gareth Milliams

Volatility is back again and its going to stay for a while. Do not fear it. It is not your enemy, it is your friend. I know that in the midst of this global economic war that that sounds strange, so I'll explain why.

First of all, high levels of volatility are a perfectly normal market phenomenon. Extreme volatility happens in 7 year cycles. So lets look back from 2008:

2008 - Credit crunch, subprime crisis.

2001 - 8 months of negative growth from March 2001 until November.

1994 - Mexican Peso Crisis leads to a halt in capital inflows in emerging markets.

1987 - BLACK MONDAY! A 22.6% crash, even bigger than that of 1929. The savings and loan crisis also begins risking the homeloans of millions of Americans.

1980 - Inflation in the US surges to 14.76% and unemployment to 7.6%. In the US,
unemployment will eventually get close to 10%.

1973 - Oil crisis as the Arab states flex their economic muscle and the beginning of
what was(until then) the deepest recession since WW2.

1966 - A 16 year Bear market begins.

1959 - Final year of a recession which began in 1957. US autosales fell by 31% in 1957 and
correspondingly unemployment reaches 20% in Detroit.

I may have got carried away with this theory but for a reason. I want you to answer this question:

"Would investing during the recession of 1987 have been a good time to begin an investment? Or 1994? Or 2001?"


Of course it would. Anybody who'd started a long term investment in those years would have made a fantastic profit.

What stopped people from doing so? Irrational fear.

Why irrational? Because all recessions come to an end and buying now, whether with a lump sum or as part of a regular savings plan is to buy at high discount. US equities are now available at 1997 prices and the FTSE is trading as if it was 1996. These really are bargains.

The trick is always to be able to find perspective in chaos. During the Great Depression in 1932 at his inaugural address, Franklin Delano Roosevelt said “The only thing we have to fear is fear itself”.

Facing up to that fear will ultimately reap fantastic profits.

Friday, 23 January 2009

The Markets: How the Banks Never Fail to Disappoint

One of the great scandals of the 21st century will be regarding how the banks spent the original TARP money. The lack of transparency from the Fed and the arrogance of the institutions has been breathtaking.

Below is a chart from www.caseyresearch.com which conversely highlights the massive cash injections into the Federal Reserve and the sharp reduction in lending since October 2008.

Lending money without strings is madness. TARP 2.0 must compel the banks to lend directly to small companies and banks. We know that we cannot trust the financial sector to lead us out of the mess that they caused, but they are still, our most efficient distributors of money.

This time though, they have to be completely accountable. Not a penny should be saved to bolster their coffers. It must all be used up in an effort to rescue the worlds economies.

January 20, 2009
The red line shows that, since August, banks have built their cash position in the form of Treasuries, agencies and deposits at the Fed by $865 billion, while their loans and leases have increased by only $325 billion.

In other words, rather than lending the billions of dollars received from the Treasury’s Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), as was originally intended, the recipient banks have squirreled away the bailout funds in order to shore up their balance sheets.

Concurrently, the Federal Reserve is exchanging its excess reserves for toxic waste from the financial institutions.

The combined affect is a “circular bailout” with the Treasury borrowing… in order to lend money to banks… that then lend it back by purchasing more Treasuries. Of course, the expense of this entire bailout scheme ultimately falls onto the back of the tax-paying public.

Wednesday, 21 January 2009

Investment: Doing Nothing By Gareth Milliams

It seems contradictory, but there are times when to do nothing is to do something. Presently, nearly all of my lump sum portfolio clients have elected to hold at least 50% in cash are underweight bullion (GLD)and underweight UltraShort Russell 2000 (TWM) and UltraShort Basic Materials Index (SMN).

We are monitoring the power commodities such as long coal, uranium and oil. Oil is still interesting because of its converse relationship with the US$. As the dollar weakens, oil strengthens and thus a strong dollar (as we have now) can push the oil price down.

Coal is the basic material that we have so much of but that we know will fall out of favour due to its ability to destroy the planet when burned. However, it is a plentiful resource and only a fool would ignore it.

Uranium shares are oversold with most stocks having experienced 80% plus losses. But it is the cleanest and most cost efficient fuel. I have a feeling that during his first State of the Union that President Obama will make a positive announcement regarding nuclear energy. He knows that America needs clean, cheap fuel and that nuclear energy gives China, India and France a competitive edge. After his first year, he will be much more subject to political mores and so needs to spend his political capital early. I may be wrong, but if I am right, then the ETF, NUCL will be an absolute buy.

Oil is falling in value on a daily basis. From $147 it now trades (as of today) at $41.15. It may drop further to less than $30, but it will breach $100 again on the back of global demand, speculation and a crippled dollar.

But for the moment, these are just on my watchlist. They will be added to my portfolio at some point. I do believe that what fuels the economy can drive our profits.

At this point I choose to do nothing. I am happy with where we are and can see no reason to buy or to sell. But doing nothing is hard. I look to myself to maintain discipline.

Investment:Transparency By Gareth Milliams

As a financial adviser, I believe that I have a moral responsibility to protect the financial assets under my care, whether it be a $500 per month savings plan or a multi million dollar portfolio. I also believe that my professionalism must not be judged by how I invest on sunny days with clear blue skies, but also in the midst of storm and disaster.

This posting however, is not about investment mistakes created by best intentions with the consent of the investor but of greed blinding best advice to consequences.

Truth always will out. In the last week, I have heard of Tokyo investors who bought shares in individual unquoted companies, that at that time had yet to produce a single penny in profit and that have now fallen by the wayside. Additionally, we may all know of friends and colleagues who bought properties in Australia and the UK, who have recently been told to provide additional security to the lender or be in breach of contract, because the Aussie Dollar and British Pound are crashing against the almighty yen. Other offshore brokerages in Tokyo have even been borrowing or cashing in investment portfolios and savings plans in order to finance deposits for investment properties that are now deeply underwater. There is a fine line between risk and moral hazard.

I am becoming more convinced every day that a code of conduct is required for those that advise expatriates upon investment. Not a generic set of regulations to encompass the industry, for that will neither be effective, nor adhered to. Instead, a published set of ground rules from each brokerage, explaining their philosophy and how they intend to interact with and protect their clients. Many firms already do this, including my company Pinnacle. We provide a ‘Letter of Understanding’ for our clients to sign that explains costs and ramifications under different scenarios when investing in savings plans.

We do this because we know that by protecting our clients we are also protecting ourselves and that is surely the best kind of regulation.

Friday, 16 January 2009

Investment: Capital Guaranteed Funds - An Expensive Oxymoron By Gareth Milliams

I am going to commit heresy. I will be taken from whence I came, hung, drawn and quartered and my body parts sent to the most extreme corners of these three islands.

I do not nor have I ever felt that capital guaranteed funds were of benefit to anybody other than those who construct or sell them. They are a money making machine aimed at nervous investors.

This is also where I must make a concession. Nervous investors are people too and need somewhere to put their money. But, if they could see through their fear and get some perspective, this is what they would see:

1. The bank offering the guarantee (typically Barclays, Deutsche or another first tier brand) would not make the guarantee, if they felt that there was a cat in hell's chance of ever having to pay it out. Thus they do serious due diligence. Therefore, ultimately should the plan mature, the client is financing an internal bond issue for the bank to benefit from.

2. Because of the guarantee only between 50% and 65% of client money will be invested in the underlying fund.

3. If the guarantee is called upon (if the fund drops below the participation level for example), the investment will be converted to cash until the end of the 10-12 year fixed period. The client will then receive his original investment minus inflation.

4. But clients who invest only in the underlying fund, have the opportunity to remain vested and benefit from a comeback. How frustrating would it be, if your guaranteed fund was in cash, but the stand alone version of the exact same underlying asset was still trading and profitable?

Surely, if an institution considers an investment sound enough for it to back with its own paper and have its name marketed on the brochure, then that in itself is a certification of the quality of the underlying asset.

But the real benefit for the bank, is that they get to keep the bond element of the investment for themselves. This will (at least) equal the original total client contribution plus possibly any additional profit.

That's a massive return. But not for you.

Thursday, 15 January 2009

The Crisis: Its All The Fault Of Goldman Sachs (of course, who else?)

A thought provoking though probably highly exaggerated piece. But its always fun to find an evil conspiracy.

Conspiracy Theory, Exposed

With Goldman emerging from the financial crisis battered but still on top, the Street is seeing something more insidiously silly: a bona fide Goldman conspiracy. “A lot of people think that they must have gotten where they are because of some unfair advantage,” hedge fund manager Bill Fleckenstein says. Read "The Usual Suspects" for more background on the whispers on Wall Street.
Close


Gavel
1. Bear Stearns
The news: In March, Bear Stearns’ stock plummeted, and clients questioned the firm’s viability. J.P. Morgan, with government assistance, agreed to buy Bear for $10 a share.
The facts: Rumors appeared in print that traders in Goldman’s London unit tried to drive Bear’s stock down.
The conspiracy theory: Goldman Sachs and other Wall Street firms have held a grudge against Bear since 1998 when the company refused to join in the $3.6 billion bailout of hedge fund Long-Term Capital Manage­ment. By spreading fear about Bear, Goldman stood to pick up some lucrative new clients. (Goldman’s response: “We went out of our way to be supportive of Bear Stearns.”)
Men
2. Merrill Lynch Sale
The news: On the weekend that the government allowed Lehman to fail, Merrill Lynch, led by C.E.O. John Thain, sold itself to Bank of America for a tidy premium. Days later, the Britain-based bank Barclays agreed to buy Lehman’s core assets for pennies, wiping out Lehman’s shareholders.
The facts: Thain was a frequent adviser to Tim Geithner, who was then president of the New York Fed. Thain also worked as Goldman’s co-president under Paulson.
The conspiracy theory: To protect Thain’s sterling reputation (and Goldman’s too), Geithner and Paulson urged him to find a buyer immediately. If he hadn’t, Merrill would have followed Lehman Brothers into oblivion.
Man
3. A.I.G. Bailout
The news: Officials agreed to extend A.I.G. an $85 billion loan—later upped to $123 billion—to prevent its collapse. Goldman C.E.O. Lloyd Blankfein was (albeit briefly) the only investment-banking chief at a key meeting to discuss the deal.
The facts: Paulson installed Goldman vice chairman Ed Liddy as A.I.G.’s new C.E.O.
The conspiracy theory: Had the insurance giant failed, Goldman would have lost big. It’s said to have $20 billion in A.I.G. exposure. (Goldman says any exposure is offset by collateral and hedges.) Liddy was put in to protect Goldman’s interests. When asked why A.I.G. was bailed out but not Lehman, Dick Fuld, Leh­man’s C.E.O., told Congress, “Until the day they put me in the ground, I will wonder.”
Syringe
4. Billions for the Banks The news: The government injected $250 billion into U.S. banks as part of its bailout plan.
The facts: Before its collapse, Lehman Brothers was looking for a capital infusion of roughly $6 billion. Unable to raise the money, the company filed for bankruptcy. The government’s bailout plan, which included $10 billion for Goldman, came in October, just three weeks after Lehman was allowed to fail.
The conspiracy theory: The government let Lehman go under to eliminate one of Goldman’s biggest competitors. Though ­Goldman’s write-downs were tiny relative to those of its competitors, it was nonetheless granted the $10 billion in the bailout to preserve its advantage.


Safe
5. Bank Holding Companies

The news: In September, with markets swooning, Goldman Sachs applied to become a bank holding company. The Federal Reserve quickly approved the move, allowing Goldman (and Morgan Stanley, which had also applied for the change) to take deposits backed by the F.D.I.C.
The facts: Over the summer, Lehman C.E.O. Dick Fuld considered converting Lehman to a bank holding company. After discussions with the Fed, Lehman didn’t apply for the change.
The conspiracy theory: Goldman was thrown a lifeline by its many friends in government. Said a former Lehman swaps trader: “They were a lot more connected in government than Fuld was. At the end of the day, that cost Lehman.”

Ban
6. Short-Selling Ban
The news: On September 19, S.E.C. Commissioner Christopher Cox announced a month-long ban on the short-selling of stocks in 799 financial companies.
The facts: Executives at Bear and Lehman had long complained to regulators about traders’ irresponsibly shorting their stocks and stoking investor panic. The S.E.C. short-selling ban was implemented after both firms failed and Goldman’s stock dropped 20 percent over three days.
The conspiracy theory: When Goldman’s competitors felt pressure from the shorts, regulators acted timidly. Once the short-sellers turned their attention to Goldman, the company used its influence to push through a ban.
Shaking
7. Rescuing Citigroup
The news: In November, after Citigroup’s stock dropped more than 60 percent in one week, the government injected $20 billion into the company—adding to the $25 billion it had already committed. The government also agreed to backstop the company’s losses once they surpass $29 billion.
The facts: Citigroup adviser and Goldman alum Robert Rubin mentored Geithner at Treasury and was one of Paulson’s contemporaries at Goldman.
The conspiracy theory: Geithner and Paulson came to the rescue of their friend. The bailout preserved Rubin’s big gig—he made more than $62 million from 2004 to 2007—despite claims he championed some of Citi’s riskiest strategies.
Globe
8. The Obama Presidency
The news: Barack Obama was elected the 44th president of the United States.
The facts: As a group, Goldman Sachs employees were among the largest donors to the Obama presidential campaign, giving more than $884,000. Former Goldman hotshots, including Rubin and New Jersey Governor Jon Cor­zine, were reportedly candidates to become Obama’s Treasury secretary. Geithner was eventually picked.
The conspiracy theory: Obama’s victory and Geith­ner’s appointment are the completion of Goldman’s meticulously crafted plan to become a superpower. The firm now has the clout to impose its will on the financial markets—and the world.

Investment: Why Fund of Funds Attract 'Ignorant Capital'

The Quote of the Day comes from David Swensen, Yale University’s endowment’s chief investment officer, in Tuesday’s WSJ:

Fund of funds are a cancer on the institutional-investor world. They facilitate the flow of ignorant capital. If an investor can’t make an intelligent decision about picking managers, how can he make an intelligent decision about picking a fund-of-funds manager who will be selecting hedge funds? There’s also more fees on top of existing fees. And the best managers don’t want fund-of-fund money because it is unreliable. You need to be in the top 10% of hedge funds to succeed. In a fund of funds, you will likely be excluded from the best managers. . .

Consultants make money by giving advice to as many people as possible. But you outperform by finding inefficiencies most of the market has not yet uncovered. So consultants ultimately end up doing a disservice to investors.

With thanks to Barry Ritholtz at www.ritholtz.com


The Crisis: A New, Very Scary Chart From Casey

I quoted Bud Conrad of Casey in a previous posting, citing his claim for a $3 trillion surplus. He now has a new graphic for it. We are screwed.

January 14, 2009

The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) has set the fiscal 2009 baseline budget deficit at $1.2 trillion in a recent report that only accounts for expenditures already legislated. Include Obama’s stimulus package, the full cost of the TARP program, and whatever else the new administration and Congress are plotting, and the deficit easily exceeds $2 trillion.

Monday, 12 January 2009

The Crisis:Fixing The Fundamentals By Gareth Milliams

There has been much conjecture and speculation upon the size of the expected Obama bailout. Figures being bandied about range from $250 billion to $1 trillion. Conventional wisdom believes that the rescue plan is absolutely necessary and should be implemented with immediate effect.

China on the other hand, will no longer be as faithful a buyer of T-Bills as it had been previously. Obviously, with less foreign currency being accumulated due to the global meltdown , there is less of a requirement to purchase treasuries.

The US government is dependent upon creditor nations to finance its spending. With China becoming less of a participant in financing federal government projects, the real debt within the American system can only increase and have an adverse effect upon the eventual great inflation.

Personally, I worry not so much about Chinese and Japanese T-Bill purchases or TARP and the various bail-outs as such (because they are needed) but fear that the system itself has not fully deleveraged. Should there be a second round of credit issues within the financial system after the bail out has been announced, then we could be in for a whole new world of hurt. Trying to fill a bucket with water knowing that it has a gaping hole in it, is never the smartest thing to do.

Another problem is this concept of 'shovel ready'. Hundreds of billion dollars will be sent to the 50 states in order to fix and improve infrastructure and buildings. The hope is that millions of construction jobs will be created. But how long will it take to go from announcement to implementation? The lead time is key. The longer it takes, the deeper the fall into the economic mire. The clock will be ticking.

So we now have a number of multi billion dollar bailouts; money pouring into a financial system that is fundamentally flawed and possibly broken; into bankrupt states that are famous for corrupt construction deals and inefficient bureaucracies; into three auto makers that make cars that nobody wants and that are outdated before they leave the drawing board.

Yet few have spoken seriously about legislative reform of the financial system or fixing the financial infrastructure. Instead, politicians grandstand for the voters with populist promises of ever bigger bailouts. This is immensely dangerous. If the system of financial distribution is broken then no amount of money could repair it.

However, it seems that the financial deficit created by this crisis is greater than previously thought.

Bud Conrad from The Casey Report writes eloquently on this subject

Can the Budget Deficit Really Grow to $3 Trillion? By Bud Conrad

The U.S. federal deficit could grow to the size of the total budget last year. That doesn’t make sense. It can’t happen.

Last fall, even before the 2008 fiscal year ending September 30 had ended, we published my calculations that the U.S. government was on track for a $1.5 trillion budget deficit in 2009. As the deficit in 2008 was a record $455 billion, a tripling of that number is serious. Initially, I was concerned that I might have been missing something, that there was something wrong with the numbers. And so I double and triple checked, and then realized that the numbers held up and even looked to understate the seriousness of the deficits. So, in recent months, we upped our forecast to expect a deficit in excess of $2 trillion.

As outlandish as that number is, with each passing day, the news supports an even further upward revision. To put a stake in the ground here at the beginning of 2009, let’s take a look at the data as we know them, then try to come to a conclusion as to just how bad it could be.

We’ll start with the base case as published by the Congressional Budget Office, the supposed non-partisan arm of Congress. The CBO base case includes only those items that have been legislated. This ignores potential updates, for example, additional spending for the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and, most importantly, Obama’s new stimulus.


They admit there’s much more. So let’s see how much will have to be borrowed by the U.S. Treasury to fund the additional outlays now expected:

  • The Obama stimulus package is expected to be $775 billion. That alone gets us pretty close to $2 trillion.

OMB makes assumptions about existing programs. Here are some snippets:

  • The defense spending is estimated at increasing 5%, but they often allocate more:

    "Final appropriations and additional funding for operations in Iraq and Afghanistan may increase outlays for 2009 and beyond, and any stimulus package may raise discretionary spending further."

The $700 billion of TARP is only entered at $180 billion of outlays by estimating the present value of all future cash flows. OMB assumes the $700 billion TARP will be spent, but they are still claiming that they are investing in some profitable ventures. Even if that is the case (and I surely don’t trust Treasury to have made good investments), they will have to borrow the entire $700 billion to buy whatever troubled assets or banks’ equity they deem necessary. Even the White House is using a cash basis, not some accounting flimflam. So I say, add the total of the TARP accounting for $520 billion more. Here is the quote:

    "Assuming that the TARP eventually disburses the full $700 billion that was specified in the legislation that created the program, CBO has estimated outlays of more than $180 billion for 2009 to account for the subsidy costs related to those investments and loans."

For economic assumptions, they recognize the economy slowing:

    "In addition, economic developments have reduced tax receipts (particularly from individual and corporate income taxes) and boosted spending on programs such as those providing unemployment compensation and nutrition assistance as well as those with cost-of-living adjustments."

The GDP is projected to be flat compared to last year, and the 3-month T-bill is estimated at only 0.2% yield for the year. From those assumptions, the "net interest payments are projected to decline by more than 20 percent." But our view is that rates are likely to rise, and the economy is likely to get even worse, leaving us with lower tax revenue. On that note, it is of interest that at the bottom of the Great Depression, tax receipts had fallen 50% from prior levels. Anything approaching that level in the current slowdown would blow an even bigger hole in the budget.

On Fannie and Freddie, the cost is recognized as only $200 billion, but those two institutions, now de facto extensions of the U.S. government, have $5 trillion in guarantees:

    "Recognizing the cost of the takeover adds about $200 billion (in discounted present-value terms) to the deficit this year, reflecting the long-term net cost of the more than $5 trillion in credit guarantees issued and loans held by those entities at the start of the fiscal year."

The purchase of mortgage-backed securities requires cash and borrowing by issuing new Treasuries, but it is not considered a loss to the budget because they are getting the asset:

    "Additionally, the Treasury is purchasing mortgage-backed securities from the private market; CBO assumes that such purchases will total nearly $250 billion this year, thereby necessitating additional borrowing of a similar amount (although the budgetary impact of the purchases, shown as an estimated subsidy amount in 2009, is relatively small)."

There is nothing in here about the new healthcare promises. Try $300 billion as a down payment.

The tab for borrowing for next year (so far)…

$1,186 Base
$775 Obama stimulus
$700 - 180 = $520 TARP fully accounted
$300 Healthcare
$250 Accounting for MBS
$100 War supplement
$100 AMT, autos, or… or…
= $3 trillion !!!!!!

The news headlines are slowly catching up, now saying the deficit will be above $1 trillion. It is actually at least $2 trillion and, if the numbers hold up, heading to $3 trillion.

$3 trillion is 21% of the $14 trillion GDP! That was the size of all spending last year. The 2008 deficit was a record at $455 billion or only 3% of GDP. Even a $2 trillion deficit would still be 14% of GDP, a very dangerous and entirely unsupportable level.

The implications are explosive. To provide just one example, the 10-year Treasury rate is currently only 2.5%. How will the government handle a 5% or 10% interest rate on its $7 trillion of debt, let alone another $3 trillion?

That said, the deficit won't be that big, because something will break first. I don't know what: the bailouts, the dollar, new taxes, riots in the streets.

Remember, this is entirely separate from the Fed’s trillion dollars in bailouts and stimulus so far, which is also feared to grow. The Fed has no requirement to get a budget approved or to project what it is doing and has thumbed its nose (I was thinking of a more graphic analogy, but this is for a general audience) at a lawsuit from Bloomberg, which asked them to reveal their actions to the public. Amazingly, all the well-known economists from Roubini, to Feldstein, to Krugman want more spending.

If anyone wants to guess what the effect will be on the dollar, interest rates, or the economy, I'm looking for opinions. I bet you can guess where I’m coming from. This isn’t just your garden variety of government excess.